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Introduction
Rent taxation in ‡uences resource allocation through various channels. Feldstein (1977) shows that a rent tax promotes capital accumulation. The rent tax lowers the price of the …xed factor (e.g. land), which reallocates a higher fraction of savings in the households'portfolio choice to the accumulation of physical capital. Consequently, welfare of steady state generations rises. 1 The e¤ect is, of course, non-existent in a small open economy in which the household portfolio choice and domestic capital accumulation are disconnected (e.g. Eaton, 1988) . As shown by Petrucci (2006) One instrument to accomplish an intergenerational Pareto-improvement might be an intergenerational transfer, such as social security payments or public debt. Instead, this paper analyzes whether the positive welfare e¤ects of rent taxation extend to transition generations in the absence of these public transfer institutions. We show that market-based adjustments may, in fact, realize an intergenerational welfare improvement. Concretely, provided the initially prevailing level of wage taxes is su¢ ciently high, introducing rent taxes to reduce wage taxes increases the sum of rental income and land value of the transitional 1 generation. The rationale is that the rise in labor supply raises the marginal productivity of land which capitalizes in the market price of land. As such, earmarking rent tax revenues is helpful in realizing an intergenerational Pareto-improvement. Rent taxation induces a forward intergenerational transfer from transitional generations to steady state generations.
The earmarking simultaneously yields a backward, market-based reaction in asset values, which compensates, possibly to a full extent, transitional generations. 2 The importance of the capitalization mechanism for intergenerational policy is also analyzed in Rangel (2005) . Rangel assumes an economy that lasts for two periods and has two overlapping generations. The older generation owns land and sells it to the younger generation in the second period. There are intergenerational public expenditures (e.g. public infrastructure) that bene…t the younger generation in the second period. This investment is more e¢ cient to do in the …rst period. Taxation is restricted to either income taxation or land taxation, and taxes are paid in the …rst period by the older generation and in the second period by the younger generation. The older generation can also use public debt; thereby expropriating the younger generation. Rangel shows that income taxes yield a less tight link between the …scal treatment of future generations and the current land price. The reason is that changes in income taxes a¤ect land price only to the extent that demand for land changes through income e¤ects, while land taxes, which are levied in the second period to top up the investment of the old generation or to repay debt accumulated in the …rst period, capitalize directly into land prices. Rangel concludes that restricting tax instruments to land taxes, rather than allowing for income taxes, would improve e¢ ciency in the provision of intergenerational goods.
Our analysis di¤ers from Rangel (2005) The presence of intergenerational trade need not always improve e¢ ciency. Poutvaara (2003) shows that the presence of intergenerational trade in a …xed factor of production that is complementary to human capital may result in overprovision of public education from the e¢ ciency point of view. In Poutvaara (2003) , the current and future working-age generations have an option to decide whether to pay taxes to provide education publicly to the younger generation, or leave investment in education to be decided privately. There are no taxes on land rents.
Finally, this paper is also related to Koethenbuerger and Poutvaara (2006) . Therein, the focus is on the size of the pay-as-you-go social security system. A reduction in the social security contribution rate increases future human capital stock, which is capitalized in the current land prices. Under certain conditions, the capital gain for pensioners, resulting from increased human capital formation, may exceed the cut in pensions, allowing for a Paretoimproving social security reform. The government is restricted to tax wages. This paper, 3 instead, allows the government to tax also land rents, in line with Rangel (2005) .
The structure of the paper is as follows: In section 2 we introduce the model. In section 3 we analyze the welfare implications of a reform of the tax mix. We provide a concluding discussion in section 4.
The Model
Consider a small open economy whose population size is normalized at unity. In any period t production combines three input factors: capital, labor and land. The amount of land is normalized to unity. Labor and capital in the economy in period t are denoted by L t and K t ,
respectively. The production function Y t = F (L t ; K t ) exhibits constant returns to scale in all three factors. Capital is internationally mobile. All markets are competitive, and therefore pro…t maximization implies
w t denotes the wage rate in period t and r is the interest rate determined in the international capital market. The land rent in period t, R t ; is given as residual
Individuals can invest their savings in the international capital market or the national land market. We assume that foreigners do not invest in the national land market. Even with integrated capital markets, full domestic land ownership could be guaranteed by foreigners facing a small transaction cost if they were to buy domestic land. In line with Gordon and Bovenberg (1996), a transaction cost in foreign land acquisition might arise due to asymmetric information on the part of investors. Such asymmetries tend to play a diminished role in international loan markets. The economy produces a composite good, which is a perfect substitute for that produced abroad. Rents are taxed at a rate R < 1. By arbitrage, land value in period t, V t , is given by
We analyze an overlapping generations model in which each cohort lives for two periods.
Since each cohort consists of homogenous households, we consider a representative household for each cohort. The sequence of decisions is depicted in Figure 1 . In the …rst period of their life individuals born in period t choose their labor supply l t and savings invested in …nancial assets s t and land acquisition V t from the old generation. In the second period of life, individuals receive the rent payment R t+1 , sell land to the current young generation and use the receipts along with the deaccumulation of …nancial assets s t (1 + r) to …nance second-
. In addition to the rent tax R , the government imposes a tax w 3 We save on notation by omitting time subscripts for the rent and wage tax rate.
5 on wage income. The …rst and second period budget constraints thus are
Household utility is
We adopt a utility function that excludes income e¤ects on labor supply; this simpli…-cation is in line with, e.g., Saez (2002) and Immervoll et al. (2007) . Households can save and borrow freely at the exogenous interest rate r, determined by the international capital market in order to smoothen their consumption over their lifetime. Labor supply of the young in period t follows from maximizing (6) subject to the budget constraints (4) and (5) which yields
dl t =dw t > 0 since income e¤ects on labor supply are absent. The elasticity of labor supply with respect to the net-of-tax wage rate is equal to .
Land price dynamics are captured by (3) . Rearranging terms, all "price-dividend"ratios consistent with arbitrage behavior must satisfy the arbitrage condition (3). For any time pro…le of land prices V t+i , i = 0; ::; 1, we have R t = R t+i = const: in a steady state. The arbitrage equation (3) states that if V t changes and R t = R t+i = const:, then V t+1 will change by the same amount as V t , multiplied by 1 + r. Thus, (3) de…nes V t+1 as a function of V t with slope dV t+1 =dV t = 1 + r > 1: The function (thick line) is illustrated in Figure 2 . A steady state V t = V t+1 = V exists. Furthermore, the steady state is unique and exhibits point stability. That is, for any value V t 6 = V the only adjustment in the land price which is consistent with perfect foresight is an immediate jump to V .
To relate the land price to the future net-of-tax land rents, we recursively substitute for the land price V t+i , i = 1; ::; 1 , in (3):
Considering R t+i to be constant from period t + 1 onwards:
Any change in land value following a tax reform in period t is captured by a jump in net-of-tax land rents in the subsequent period. Finally, we note that the net foreign assets 7 of the economy in period t; F t , satisfy the transversality condition lim
as each generation's budget constraint is satis…ed over its lifetime and r > 0.
Rent Tax Reform
We consider a rise in rent taxes at the beginning of period t; before the young generation supplies labor and the current elderly sell their land to the young generation. The proceeds are used to reduce the wage tax. The current young cohort and the newly born generations bene…t from the tax reform. They are subject to a lower wage tax and trade land at the new steady state price. The current old cohort experiences a change in the value of land holdings. To verify whether it is a gain or loss, we …rst de…ne labor demand, capital demand and the wage rate as a function of the wage tax. The …rst-order condition for capital demand de…nes L t (K t ) and following (2) R t (K t ). Via the …rst-order condition for labor demand, we get w t (K t ). Inserting L t (K t ) and w t (K t ) into the labor market clearing condition yields
The slope of the various functions is
where := F KK F LL F 2 KL > 0. Capital employment depends negatively on the level of wage taxation, i.e. dK t =d w < 0. A higher wage tax discourages labor supply. Since labor and capital are complements in production, this lowers the marginal productivity of capital and thus leads to an out ‡ow of capital. Straightforwardly, the e¤ect of the wage tax on labor supply, dL t =dK t dK t =d w , and on the gross wage rate, dw t =dK t dK t =d w , is negative.
Capital employment is not in ‡uenced by the rent tax since income changes in response to a 4 l 0 t denotes the derivative of labor supply with respect to the net-of-tax wage rate (1 w ) w t .
8 hike in the rent tax do not a¤ect labor supply.
The public sector budget constraint is T t = w w t L t + R R t . Keeping tax revenues constant, tax rates are related as
with @T t @ R = R t > 0 and
We consider an economy which is on the up-ward sloping part of the tax revenue hill,
Otherwise, a trade-o¤ between rent and wage taxes in terms of tax revenues would not exist. A reduction in the wage tax rate would allow for a cut in the rent tax so as to keep tax revenues constant. An intergenerational Pareto-improvement would trivially follow. We denote the wage tax rate at which @T t =@ w = 0 by w .
Using (7), (9) and (10) and invoking stationarity of land rents (R t+1 = R t ) we can compute the change in the net-of-tax rent payment and the land price in response to a budget-balancing increase in the rent tax in period t:
The transition generation bene…ts from the tax reform if and only if (11) is positive.
Resorting to a Cobb-Douglas production function with and ( ; > 0; + < 1)
denoting the share of output accruing to labor and capital, we …nd:
Proposition. Consider an economy in which @T t =@ w > 0. There always exists an interval of wage tax rates ( w ; w ), w < w and w ; w 2 (0; 1), for which a change of the tax mix from wage to rent taxation improves welfare of the transition generation .
The proof is relegated to the appendix. A rent tax lowers the land value and rental income, ceteris paribus. The budget-balancing reduction in labor taxes, however, increases labor supply. This, in turn, increases land productivity in the current and future periods.
This capitalizes in the land price and may compensate for the negative e¤ect of higher rent taxation, together with the current increase in land rents. In fact, a pre-existing labor tax compute the marginal tax rate on working for di¤erent income deciles and countries. 6 
Concluding Discussion
Governments can rely on various tax bases to …nance their expenditures. In the presence of a …xed factor of production, taxing land rents would be the most e¢ cient way of …nancing public expenditures from the perspective of steady-state generations. However, were a rent tax to be established, its future tax revenues are capitalized in the current asset prices. This creates a con ‡ict of interest between the current owners of land, and future generations.
In this paper, we show that rent taxation, when combined with a budget-balancing reduction in wage taxes, may also bene…t transition generations. The key mechanism here is the endogeneity of labor supply. A cut in wage taxes increases current and future labor supply, and this increases the income accruing to land, when land and labor are complements in production. Provided that the initial wage taxes are su¢ ciently high, this increase in gross rents may outweigh the e¤ects of a moderate hike in the tax on land rents.
Our analysis relies on a simple analytical model, allowing for explicit solutions. One restrictive assumption we make is that the labor supply in the second period of life is zero. Finally, incorporating income e¤ects on labor supply may undermine the commonality of interest between transitional generations and steady state generations. When leisure is normal in consumption, a lower wage tax yields an income e¤ect on labor supply which runs against the substitution e¤ect. On net, labor supply may still increase, but at a lower magnitude. As such, the capitalization mechanism is less e¤ective in transferring part of the future welfare gains to the transition generation.
A Appendix: Proof of the Proposition
For notational simplicity, we omit the time subscript throughout. Inserting (10) into (11) and invoking stationarity
Assuming
, a necessary and su¢ cient condition for (12) to be positive is
Using the chain rule the condition reads
Evaluating the responses di dK , i = w; L; K (see (8) ) for the Cobb-Douglas production
Inserting w = L 1 K and collecting terms 13 Eq. (14) = L K + (
Using the …rst-order condition for capital demand, r = L K 1 , to substitute for K, and rearranging yields
We decompose
Furthermore, labor supply is l = ((1 w ) w t ) . Substituting w by the …rst-order condition
Setting l = L and solving for L yields
Taking the derivative
Inserting (17) and (18) 
Recall, provided @T =@ w > 0 the sum of rental income and land value of the transitional generation increases, d (1
> 0, if and only if
Equivalently stated,
We next derive the condition under which
holds. As can be inferred from (12) 
2
(1 (1 !) ) 2 < 0:
Similarly,
To determine the maximal and minimal value of w and w , we …rst observe that
and, applying L'Hôpital's rule, we …nd
Given by (21) Thus, w ; w 2 (0; 1) which completes the proof.
